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Wayne is a 15-year-old black male from southeastern
Louisiana who has just been waived to adult court, convicted of
armed robbery with a firearm and given the mandatory minimum
sentence of 15 years of incarceration without the possibility of
parole as punishment for his crime. Many may find a 15-year
sentence perfectly reasonable for such a serious violent felony
regardless of the offender's youth. Would opinions change,
however, if it were discovered Wayne was not the hardened
"superpredator"' many might assume him to be? Suppose Wayne
never received any treatment for a dual diagnosis of mild mental
retardation and bipolar disorder, functions at a third-grade level in
both reading and math, and had no trouble with the law prior to
this incident. Furthermore, his role in the crime was that of a
lookout who never left the car while the two adult codefendants-
who pressured Wayne into participating in the crime-carried out
the robbery inside the store. None of these facts were presented to
a juvenile judge prior to Wayne's transfer because the district
attorney waived Wayne to adult court by indictment before he
could even meet with his assigned juvenile defender. Even if
Wayne had consulted with counsel prior to transfer, the juvenile
defender could have done little to prevent the waiver. This is
particularly true if Wayne's lawyer could not prove Wayne
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1. The term "superpredator" refers to a since-debunked stereotype created
by the national media in the 1990s that still persists to this day and portrays
youthful offenders as violent, unfeeling, fledgling career criminals without any
prospect for rehabilitation. See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young
"Superpredators, " Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al 9.
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incompetent because he does not meet the high legal standard
required for establishing mental incapacity to proceed.
Now, instead of being placed in a juvenile prison to receive
special education services, vocational training, and intensive
medical and mental health treatment until the age of 21, Wayne
will spend the next half of his life in a punitive adult prison where,
for at least the first few years, he will be a target because of his
size, youth, and disability. 2 Wayne will most likely emerge from
prison without job skills or an education but with new criminal
know-how and an untreated and aggravated severe mental illness.
These and a number of other considerations are relevant not only
to the degree of empathy Wayne's predicament might elicit from
the average person, but also to his culpability, his amenability to
rehabilitation, and the likelihood his incarceration as an adult will
make society safer down the road and otherwise be a wise use of
public funds. Yet none of these revelations are legally relevant to
the process that resulted in Wayne's transfer, conviction, and
sentence, not because there was some sort of break down in the
system, but quite to the contrary: because the transfer system in
this case worked exactly as it was designed by the Louisiana
Legislature.
Wayne's case is just one example of how Louisiana's current
system for waiving juveniles to adult courts of criminal jurisdiction
can, and often does, result in harsh and irreversible outcomes
detrimental to both the youth involved and, in the long run,
society. 3 In Louisiana, an increasingly rigid set of rules related to
waiver and sentencing-which ignore what is known about
adolescent development-intersects with a lack of procedural
safeguards and judicial discretion, resulting in the unnecessary
transfer of youth amenable to rehabilitation in a manner that
neither promotes public safety nor is fiscally sound. Part I of this
Article will examine both the history and the current structure of
Louisiana's system for trying youth as adults, focusing on
understanding the rationale used in bringing about the current
system. Part II of this Article will provide an analysis of some
particularly troubling individual components of the waiver system
2. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS
OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA (2007), available at
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/
CFYJ-JailingJuveniles Report 2007-11-15.pdf.
3. Wayne's account is a theoretical example based on a conglomerate of
actual cases with which the authors are familiar. For similar stories of transfer
involving real cases from Louisiana, see Juvenile Justice Project of La., The
Children of Transfer, JUV. JUST. PROJECT LA. (July 19, 2010), http://jjpl.org/
new/index.php?s-the+children+of+transfer.
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and how they interact to result in the transfer to adult court of
youth who would be better served by the more rehabilitative
juvenile justice system. More specifically, this Section will
examine how mandatory sentencing, the law of principals, and
expansive waiver provisions interact with the absence of
procedural safeguards such as reverse waiver, competency
protections, and standards which take into account our evolving
understanding of adolescent development to result in the wasteful
use of public resources on a system which harms youth who could
be rehabilitated without increasing public safety or advancing other
stated penological purposes. Part III provides recommendations
and analyses of potential remedies for the failures in Louisiana's
current transfer system and an examination of how those remedies
have operated in other jurisdictions to minimize the unnecessary
use of transfer. The Article concludes that the only way to provide
the due process protections and individualized determinations
necessary to ensure only youth unamenable to rehabilitation are
waived to adult court is through the total elimination of legislative
and prosecutorial waiver in favor of an exclusive reliance on
judicial waiver. Recognizing the extremely unlikely prospects for
such a sweeping change, however, this Article suggests a number
of other less comprehensive recommendations that could be more
feasibly implemented in the current political climate and still
mitigate some of the most dire effects of the current system.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOUISIANA'S CURRENT
WAIVER SYSTEM
A. Louisiana's Current Waiver System
In Louisiana, 17 is the age of criminal jurisdiction, meaning
anyone accused of committing a criminal offense at an earlier age
is generally tried as a juvenile in the state's delinquency system.
However, the Louisiana Constitution grants the state legislature the
authority to establish a statutory framework for waiving youth to
adult court for certain enumerated offenses. The Louisiana
4. LA. CONST. art. V, § 19.
5. Id. Article V, section 19 provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he legislature may (1) by a two-thirds vote of the elected members
of each house provide that special juvenile procedures shall not apply
to juveniles arrested for having committed first or second degree
murder, manslaughter, aggravated rape, armed robbery, aggravated
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree murder,
attempted second degree murder, forcible rape, simple rape, second
degree kidnapping, a second or subsequent aggravated battery, a second
193
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Legislature opted to exercise this constitutional authority by
creating within the Children's Code three distinct types of waiver
applicable in certain cases, depending on the age of the youth and
the offense charged. The types of waiver established in Louisiana
fit within the three broad categories of waiver employed by other
states and can be identified as: (1) legislative waiver; (2)
prosecutorial waiver; and (3) judicial waiver.
1. Legislative Waiver
Legislative waiver, also known as statutory or automatic
waiver, refers to the type of waiver that occurs when offenses are
statutorily excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.7 In Louisiana,
article 305(A) of the Children's Code provides for legislative
waiver by divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction in cases in
which a child who is 15 years of age or older is accused of "first
degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated rape, or
aggravated kidnapping."8 Divestiture of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction occurs immediately once either an indictment charging
one of the enumerated offenses is returned or the juvenile court
makes a finding of probable cause as to one of those offenses at a
continued custody hearing, also known as a detention hearing.9
Notwithstanding the name, it is important to note that as a result of
the unfettered charging discretion of district attorneys, it is
or subsequent aggravated burglary, a second or subsequent offense of
burglary of an inhabited dwelling, or a second or subsequent felony-
grade violation of Part X or X-B of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, involving the manufacture,
distribution, or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous
substances, and (2) by two-thirds vote of the elected members of each
house lower the maximum ages of persons to whom juvenile
procedures shall apply, and (3) by two-thirds vote of the elected
members of each house establish a procedure by which the court of
original jurisdiction may waive special juvenile procedures in order that
adult procedures shall apply in individual cases.
Id.
6. Lucy S. McGOUGH & KERRY TRICHE, LOUISIANA CHILDREN'S CODE
HANDBOOK 2009-2010, at 448 (2009). For a more general discussion of these
and other types of waiver not employed in Louisiana, such as blended
jurisdiction and "once an adult always an adult" systems, see Donna M. Bishop,
Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81
(2000).
7. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to
Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 196 (1998).
8. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A) (Supp. 2010).
9. Id.
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prosecutors who still have primary control over a juvenile's
exposure to legislative waiver by virtue of their election to bring a
youth before the juvenile court or grand jury under an enumerated
charge.'0 Once probable cause has been found for an enumerated
offense, however, the prosecution has no further discretion as to
waiver because the juvenile court's jurisdiction is automatically
divested.
2. Prosecutorial Waiver
Prosecutorial waiver refers to the type of transfer where the
district attorney has complete discretion as to whether youth of a
certain age charged with certain offenses are tried as juveniles or
as adults." In Louisiana, prosecutorial waiver can be used to
transfer juveniles who are 15 years of age or older and charged
with offenses enumerated in article 305(B) of the Children's
Code. 12 The district attorney can elect to transfer a child either by
obtaining an indictment or by filing a bill of information in the
criminal court after a finding of probable cause by the juvenile
court at a continued custody hearing.13  Alternatively, the
prosecution can elect to trX4 the child as a juvenile by filing a
petition in juvenile court. The prosecutorial waiver statute
10. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61 (2003) ("Subject to the supervision
of the attorney general, as provided in Article 62, the district attorney has entire
charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his
district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute.").
11. See Feld, supra note 7, at 197.
12. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B). The enumerated offenses are:
(a) Attempted first degree murder; (b) Attempted second degree
murder; (c) Manslaughter; (d) Armed robbery; (e) Aggravated
burglary; (f) Forcible rape; (g) Simple rape; (h) Second degree
kidnapping; ... (j) Aggravated battery committed with a firearm; (k) A
second or subsequent aggravated battery; (1) A second or subsequent
aggravated burglary; (m) A second or subsequent offense of burglary of
an inhabited dwelling; (n) A second or subsequent felony-grade
violation of Part X or X-B of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950 involving the manufacture, distribution, or
possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Neither the statute nor case law specifically addresses whether
electing to file a petition in juvenile court settles the issue of jurisdiction with
finality and bars the prosecution from subsequently waiving the youth to adult
court via indictment or bill of information. However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in State v. Hamilton apparently found it to be of no moment that the
prosecution had indeed filed a petition in juvenile court prior to filing a bill of
information because it ultimately allowed the waiver of the juvenile without any
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contains a time limitation applicable only to instances in which the
juvenile is being held in detention requiring the district attorney to
"make his election and file the indictment, bill of information, or
petition in the appropriate court within thirty calendar days after
the child's arrest, unless the child waives this right."' 5
3. Judicial Waiver
Under judicial waiver (usually referred to as transfer), a child
can be transferred to adult court only after a hearing is held in
which a juvenile court judge makes an individualized
determination that the juvenile meets certain criteria making him
proper for transfer.16 In Louisiana, articles 857 through 864 of the
Children's Code govern judicial transfer, which may be applied to
children who are 14 years of age or older and charged with one of
seven enumerated offenses. A transfer hearing can be held at the
request of the child, the prosecution, or on the court's own motion
any time after a delinquency petition has been filed but before the
adjudication hearing or the acceptance of a guilty plea.'8 After
discussion of or reference to the previously filed petition outside of the
statement of facts. 676 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1996). The question of whether the state
can change its mind as to prosecutorial waiver once a petition has been filed
remains open despite the court's tacit acceptance of the occurrence in Hamilton.
15. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3). The statute is silent as to the
appropriate remedy for the state's failure to take any action during this time
period. However, in Hamilton, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected arguments
that the time limit imposed by article 305(B)(3) is jurisdictional in nature so as
to preclude the ability to transfer a juvenile to criminal court once the 30-day
time period has elapsed. 676 So. 2d 1081. Rather, the Court held that "[t]he
proper remedy for an untimely filing of a bill of information or indictment under
[article] 305(B)(3) should be release without bail rather than the quashing of
charges against the defendant." Id. at 1084 (comparing LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 305(B)(3) with LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (Supp. 2010) and LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 843 (2004)). As a result, the only time constraint on
prosecutorial waiver is the normal prescriptive period (the civil law equivalent
of a statute of limitation) for the charged offense.
16. See Feld, supra note 7, at 198.
17. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857(A) (Supp. 2010). The enumerated
offenses are:
(1) First degree murder; (2) Second degree murder; (3) Aggravated
kidnapping; (4) Aggravated rape; (5) Aggravated battery when
committed by the discharge of a firearm; (6) Armed robbery when
committed with a firearm; ... (8) Forcible rape if the rape is committed
upon a child at least two years younger than the rapist.
Id.
18. Id. art. 858 (2004). A recent amendment to article 305 of the Children's
Code even allows the juvenile court to hold transfer hearings for individuals
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such hearing, the juvenile court can elect to transfer a child if the
state establishes probable cause for the alleged offense and proves
by clear and convincing evidence that "there is no substantial
opportunity for the child's rehabilitation" in light of six statutorily
established criteria. 9
Additionally, the judicial transfer article contains a special
sentencing rule for judicially transferred 14 year olds barring them
from receiving a sentence of incarceration beyond their 31st
birthday regardless of the offense. 20 Although in theory an article
857 transfer can be used against 14, 15, and 16 year olds, it is
rarely used against anyone but 14 year olds because each of the
enumerated offenses in article 857 is similarly listed under either
article 305(A) or 305(B), giving prosecutors a much easier route
for the transfer of youth who are older than 14. The remaining
articles establish several procedural protections relevant to judicial
transfer hearings such as the child's notice rights, evidentiary rules,
rights to medical and psychological examinations, discovery rights,
and the right to judicial review along with the rules regarding
places of detention for children both before and after the issuing of
a transfer order.21
who were charged with article 857 offenses as juveniles but have reached the
age of 21 years without disposition of the case due to a continued mental
incapacity to proceed. Id. art. 305(E)(2) (Supp. 2010); see MCGOUGH & TRICHE,
supra note 6, at 30.
19. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 862(A)(2) (2009). The criteria are:
(a) The age, maturity, both mental and physical, and sophistication of
the child.
(b) The nature and seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires transfer.
(c) The child's prior acts of delinquency, if any, and their nature and
seriousness.
(d) Past efforts at rehabilitation and treatment, if any, and the child's
response.
(e) Whether the child's behavior might be related to physical or mental
problems.
(f) Techniques, programs, personnel, and facilities available to the
juvenile court which might be competent to deal with the child's
particular problems.
Id.
20. Id. art. 857(B) (Supp. 2010).
21. See id. arts. 858-61, 863-64 (2004). As of 2008, article 857 of the
Children's Code also allows adults who are charged with offenses they allegedly
committed as children to be tried as adults if the prescriptive period for the
offense has not lapsed. Said individuals may be tried and sentenced as adults
regardless of whether jurisdiction could have been waived for the offense when
they were juveniles, except that if the offense were not waivable, the
individual's incarceration may not exceed the maximum amount of time he or
197
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B. The Evolution of Waiver in Louisiana
1. Legislative Waiver
Legislative waiver in Louisiana is as old as the state's juvenile
justice system itself, significantly predating the two other types of
waiver. In 1906, the Louisiana Legislature passed a statute
establishing the state's first juvenile courts and their authority over
children in delinquency proceedings. 22  The act defined a
delinquent child as any child under the age of 16 "who may be
charged with the violation of any law of this State, (excepting
murder, manslaughter, rape)," thereby preserving original criminal
court jurisdiction for those three offenses. 23 Two years later, the
legislature enacted a constitutional amendment that raised the age
of adult criminal jurisdiction to 17 and omitted any specific
reference to offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.24
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the new
constitutional provision as excluding murder from the jurisdiction
of the new juvenile courts, holding that it could not "reasonably so
construe the act as to result in leaving a child under 17 years of age
free to commit murder under no greater penalty than being
subjected to reformatory discipline during the period of his
minority."2 5
she could have received as a juvenile. Id. art. 857(C) (Supp. 2010); see also
State v. Havis, 874 So. 2d 153 (La. 2004) (involving a defendant who was
convicted at age 21 for a crime committed when he was 14 years old).
22. 1906 La. Acts 134.
23. Id.; see also In re Parker, 43 So. 54, 55 (La. 1907).
24. 1908 La. Acts 96, 99 (amending the Louisiana Constitution of 1898).
The amendment was designed to substitute the 1906 statute in its entirety
because of a technical defect in the earlier statute that made it constitutionally
unenforceable in the Parish of Orleans.
25. State v. Howard, 52 So. 539 (La. 1910), overruled in part by State v.
Dabon, 111 So. 461 (La. 1927). The court also suggested in dicta that other
capital crimes would similarly be excluded from the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts, stating:
If the Legislature, in enacting Act No. 83 referred to, had contemplated
that children less than 17 years of age, charged with the crime of
murder by indictment, should be tried before the juvenile court, the
statute would certainly have provided for such trials therein; but the act
fails to do so. Cases in which children are charged with the commission
of a crime carrying with it the death penalty are nowhere referred to.
Id at 354-55. Curiously, the court's opinion did not reference the supplanted act
of 1906, which did contain an explicit statutory waiver provision for certain
offenses, and so did not consider whether the exclusion of those same specific
198 [ Vol. 71
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The Louisiana Constitution of 1913 left no room for
interpretation as to the framers' intent to exclude capital crimes
from juvenile court jurisdiction by stating that juvenile courts
"shall have jurisdiction, except for capital crimes, of the trial of all
children under seventeen years of age who may be charged in said
courts as neglected or delinquent children."26 The Louisiana
Constitution of 1924 maintained almost the exact wording of its
predecessor regarding juvenile court jurisdiction, except in
addition to capital crimes it added "assault with intent to commit
rape" as an offense excluded from the jurisdiction of the state's
juvenile courts. 2 7 Thus, legislative waiver was not just firmly
established, but had been evolving for more than half a century in
Louisiana before a system of either prosecutorial or judicial waiver
came into existence.
Louisiana's system of legislative waiver continues to evolve in
modem constitutional times. The Louisiana Constitution as
adopted in 1974 maintained the automatic exclusion of capital
offenses and attempted aggravated rape from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts, but for the first time put a floor on the age of
automatic waiver by limiting its application to children 15 years of
age or older.2 8 A 1979 amendment removed the rules for
legislative waiver directly from the constitution, instead merging
the concept into the general structure of the constitutional
provision which merely authorized the statutory creation of one or
more types of waiver in cases involving certain enumerated
offenses. 9 In turn, the legislature amended Louisiana Revised
exceptions in the replacement bill drafted just two years later was purposeful
given that context.
26. LA. CONST. of 1913, art. CXVIII, § 3.
27. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, § 52. Capital crimes during this period
included willful murder, rape, poisoning with intent to commit murder, any type
of battery with a dangerous weapon while lying in wait with the intent to
commit murder, and certain types of kidnapping. SOLOMON WOLFF,
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF LOUISIANA 388-96 (1920).
28. LA. CONST. art. V, § 19 (amended 1979) ("Except for a person fifteen
years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a capital offense or
attempted aggravated rape, the determination of guilt or innocence, the
detention, and the custody of a person who is alleged to have committed a crime
prior to his seventeenth birthday shall be exclusively pursuant to special juvenile
procedures which shall be provided by law.").
29. LA. CONST. art. V, § 19 (amended 1994). Under this formulation, the
legislature could only create a system of waiver for seven enumerated offenses
contained in the constitutional provision: "first or second degree murder,




Statutes section 13:1570(A)(5) to create a system of statutory
waiver granting exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction over all
children except for "a child who, after having become fifteen years
of age or older is charged with having committed first degree
murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated rape, or a
person who, after becoming sixteen years of age or older is
charged with having committed armed robbery, aggravated
burglary, or aggravated kidnapping."3 0 This was the first time a
waiver provision created age-based subclasses of children subject
to statutory waiver by exercising the full extent of its constitutional
authority to subject all seven enumerated offenses to statutory
waiver only with regard to 16 year olds, sparing 15 year olds from
automatic waiver for the three less serious crimes.
After its passage, several cases unsuccessfully challenged the
constitutionality of this new legislative waiver statute based on
equal protection and due process concerns.3 1 In State v. Perique,
the most definitive of these cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court
refused to apply the same due process arguments to legislative
waiver, which, in both a state-State in the Interest of Hunter-
and federal-Kent v. United States-Supreme Court case,
successfully overturned separate judicial waiver statutes that
similarly did not include individualized standards for transfer.32 in
reaching its decision, the court found that the general rule of non-
criminal treatment of juveniles, upon which the decision in Hunter
was based, no longer applied under the amended wording of
Article V, Section 19 of the Louisiana Constitution, which now
allowed "the legislature to enact a statute exempting any juvenile
arrested for any of the seven enumerated offenses from 'special
juvenile procedures."' 33 The court then found the statute in
question did not implicate the due process concerns addressed b 4
Kent at all, but instead implicated only the state's police powers.
The court based this distinction on the fact that the statute in Kent
granted the defendant the "special rights and protections"
30. 1980 La. Acts 1113, 1114.
31. See State v. Leach, 425 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1983); see also State v.
Perique, 439 So. 2d 1060 (La. 1983).
32. See Perique, 439 So. 2d at 1062 (distinguishing State ex rel. Hunter,
387 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1980), and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)).
33. Id. at 1063. However, subsequent Louisiana Supreme Court rulings
have continued to refer to a general rule of "non-criminal treatment" of
juveniles. See, e.g., In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 396 (La. 1998). Furthermore, the
relevance of this distinction is unclear since the ruling in Hunter was specifically
predicated not upon the subsequently amended Article V of the Louisiana
Constitution, but upon the due process clause, which has not been amended. See
Hunter, 387 So. 2d at 1086.
34. Perique, 387 So. 2d at 1064.
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associated with the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court making waiver of jurisdiction a "critically
important" act. The challenge of the Louisiana legislative waiver
provision, however, did not actually lead to a "transfer" of
jurisdiction because it made waiver automatic, preserving the
original jurisdiction of the criminal court, and so did not create a
statutory right subject to due process protections.36 This holding in
Perique gave the green light for further expansion of legislative
waiver and the subsequent addition of prosecutorial waiver and
continues to be the law of the land.
The consolidation of transfer statutes within the new Louisiana
Children's Code in 1991 preserved its predecessor's distinction
between 15 and 16 year olds, but limited statutory waiver for 16
year olds to the offenses of first degree murder, second degree
murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping and for 15
year olds to the offenses of first degree murder, second degree
murder, and aggravated rape. 37  The legislature removed
35. Id.
36. Id. However, unlike the statute analyzed by the court in Perique, the
current wording of Louisiana Children's Code article 305 makes it clear that a
child facing either legislative or prosecutorial waiver "is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the juvenile court until" the divesting event occurs. LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 305(A)(1), (B)(1) (Supp. 2010).
37. 1991 La. Acts 706, 717-18. At the time, Louisiana Children's Code
article 305(A) and (B) provided:
A.(l) When a child is sixteen years of age or older at the time of the
commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated
rape, or aggravated kidnapping, he is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the juvenile court until either:
(a) An indictment charging one of these offenses is returned.
(b) The juvenile court holds a continued custody hearing pursuant to
Articles 819 and 820 and finds probable cause that he committed one of
these offenses, whichever occurs first.
(2) Thereafter, the child is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction for all subsequent
procedures, including the review of bail applications and the child shall
be transferred forthwith to the appropriate adult facility for detention
prior to his trial as an adult.
B.(l) When a child is fifteen years of age or older at the time of the
commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, or
aggravated rape, he is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court until either:
(a) An indictment charging one of these offenses is returned.
(b) The juvenile court holds a continued custody hearing pursuant to
Articles 819 and 820 and finds probable cause that he committed one of
these offenses, whichever occurs first.
Id.
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manslaughter, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary altogether
from the list of enumerated offenses subject to statutory waiver,
and instead placed those three offenses in the state's first
prosecutorial waiver provision contained later in the statute.38 The
original Children's Code statute was also the first to specify that
the triggering event for the divestiture of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction was either the return of an indictment or the finding of
probable cause for an enumerated offense by the juvenile court at a
continued custody hearing.39 In 1994, the legislature amended
article 305(A) of the Children's Code into its current form:
eliminating any distinction between 15 and 16 year olds, subjecting
all children 15 years of age or older to statutory waiver for the
offenses of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated
rape, and aggravated kidnapping. The most recent amendment to
Article V, Section 19 of the Louisiana Constitution, passed shortly
after the 1994 amendment to Children's Code article 305(A), in
theory expanded the power of the legislature to subject offenses to
statutory waiver by adding nine more enumerated offenses to
complete the current list of transferable offenses. 40 However, the
legislature opted to leave the statutory waiver provision untouched
and limited to the four offenses which carry a penalty of life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence. The remaining transferable offenses have
instead been allocated among the provisions related to
prosecutorial and judicial waiver.
A theory one might employ to explain the evolution of the
state's system of legislative waiver is that Louisiana's progression
employed evolving standards of decency and understanding of
children based on common sense notions of adolescence. To
explain, Louisiana began in 1906 with the premise that no serious
crime could ever be considered juvenile. However, by the time
Louisiana's Children's Code was enacted in 1992, the legislative
waiver system included considerations of age as well as offense.
This is at least a tacit acceptance of the idea that some children are
38. Id. at 717-19.
39. Id. at 717.
40. LA. CONST. art. V, § 19. The added offenses are:
[A]ttempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder,
forcible rape, simple rape, second degree kidnapping, a second or
subsequent aggravated battery, a second or subsequent aggravated
burglary, a second or subsequent offense of burglary of an inhabited
dwelling, or a second or subsequent felony-grade violation . . .
involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to
distribute controlled dangerous substances.
Id.
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too young for adult court-no matter the crime. The Louisiana
Legislature reached this result intuitively without benefit of any of
the research relating to adolescent brain development existing
today. In other words, common sense notions of childhood and
adolescent development led the legislature to conclude that it is
one thing for a 16 year old to commit an armed robbery, but quite
another for a 12 year old to commit an armed robbery. Today,
while common sense is codified, new science struggles for
acceptance in laws governing how Louisiana treats children in
delinquency, particularly where waiver is concerned. The
reduction of legislative waiver offenses from seven in 1979 to the
current four can be seen more as a result of the expansion of
prosecutorial waiver rather than a growing recognition or
acceptance that even juveniles who commit the most serious
offenses may still benefit from the rehabilitative nature of the
juvenile justice system.
2. Judicial Waiver
Shortly after the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 introduced the
first statutory creation of various types of waiver, the legislature
passed the state's first statute creating a system of judicial
waiver.4 1 The first judicial transfer statute differs substantially
from the current one, most notably by allowing the transfer of
youth age 15 or older for any state or local offense while at the
same time requiring a prior adjudication for one of nine serious
violent felonies.4 2 The statute did contain a number of procedural
41. 1974 La. Acts 1312, 1313-14. For the next decade and a half until the
creation of the Children's Code, the laws regulating judicial transfer would be
contained and modified within Title 13 of the Revised Statutes from sections
1571.1 to 1571.4. The Code of Juvenile Procedure, which went into effect on
January 1, 1979, contained an article entitled "Juvenile jurisdiction over
children; exceptions," but the article did not contain any substantive or
procedural changes and merely referenced cases transferred pursuant to
procedures in sections 1571.1 to 1571.4 as exceptions to the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. 1978 La. Acts 508, 518.
42. 1974 La. Acts 1312. The statute provides:
A. Effective January 1, 1975, after a petition has been filed alleging
delinquency based on conduct which is designated a crime or public
offense by the statutes of the United States, of this state, or by
ordinance of local political subdivisions exercising general
governmental functions, the court, before hearing the petition on its
merits, may transfer the alleged offender for prosecution to the
appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction if the district attorney,
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protections which remain intact to this day.43 One important due
process protection not included, however, was the requirement the
juvenile court find probable cause the youth committed the offense
in question. The only prerequisite for transfer was the rather low
standard that the court find "reasonable grounds to believe that the
child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through
facilities available to the juvenile court."44 The judicial transfer
statute was amended in 1975 to add a subsection D, which made
armed robbery and capital crimes the sole offenses for which a
child could be transferred to adult court without any prior
adjudications. 45 During this period, several cases challenged to no
avail the legality of the new judicial transfer s stem established in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:1571.1.4
the alleged offender, or the court on its own motion, files a transfer
petition and the following conditions are met:
(1) The child has attained the age of fifteen years or more at the time
of the alleged conduct;
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in
conformity with R.S. 13:1571.2;
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place and purpose of the hearing is
given to the child and his parents, tutor, or other custodian at least ten
days before the hearing; and
(4) The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through facilities
available to the juvenile court.
(5) The child has previously been adjudicated a delinquent by the
commission of any of the following offenses: second degree murder,
manslaughter, negligent homicide, simple rape, armed robbery,
aggravated battery, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and
aggravated kidnapping.
B. The transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over
the child with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the petition.
C. No child, either before or after attaining the age of seventeen shall
be prosecuted in criminal court for an offense which was allegedly
committed by the child who had not then attained the age of seventeen
unless the case has been transferred to criminal court as provided
herein, or except as otherwise provided by law.
Id at 1313-14.
43. Id. In addition to the notice requirement contained in section
1571.1(A)(3), sections 1571.2 through 1571.4 contained several other important
procedural protections related to transfer hearings, such as a right to have the
transfer hearing recorded if requested, the right to counsel, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to introduce evidence, and the right to appeal.
44. 1974 La. Acts at 1313-14.
45. 1975 La. Acts 764, 765.
46. See, e.g., State v. Everfield, 342 So. 2d 648 (La. 1977). In Everfield, a
juvenile defendant challenged his judicial transfer to adult court for the offense
of armed robbery, alleging that section 1571.1 was unconstitutional because it
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In 1978, the legislature amended the judicial transfer statute by
abrogating the sole substantive standard for transfer-i.e., a
finding of reasonable grounds to believe the child is not amenable
to treatment or rehabilitation-and replacing it with a finding "that
probable cause exists that the child committed one of the following
offenses as alleged in the original petition: first or second degree
murder, manslaughter, aggravated rape, armed robbery, aggravated
burglary, or aggravated kidnapping."47 In 1980, however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Hunter struck down the new provision
as unconstitutionally vague, finding that the adoption of the
singular criterion of a determination of probable cause as the
standard for permitting judicial transfer violates the essentials of
due process and fair treatment "because it leaves juvenile court
judges free to cause forfeiture of important rights without any
legally fixed standards and provides juvenile accused no protection
against arbitrary or discriminatory action." 48 As a result, the
legislature amended the statute by generally limiting judicial
transfer hearings to cases involving three enumerated offenses and
implementing, for the first time, a dual standard requiring a finding
that:
(a) probable cause exists to believe that the child has
committed armed robbery, aggravated burglary or
aggravated kidnapping and is not subject to the original
jurisdiction of criminal district court; and (b) after an
individual consideration of the case and consideration of all
relevant and material circumstances, the court concludes
exceeded the authority of Article V, Section 19 of the Louisiana Constitution,
violated the separation of powers doctrine contained in Article II, Section 2, and
infringed upon his equal protection and due process rights under both the federal
and state constitutions. Everfield, 342 So. 2d at 652.
47. 1978 La. Acts 1136, 1137.
48. State ex rel. Hunter, 387 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (La. 1980), superseded by
constitutional amendment, LA. CON. art. V, § 19 (amended 1994); see also State
v. Perique, 439 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (La. 1983). The singular, probable cause-
based standard was analyzed by the court under the original wording of the 1974
constitution rather than the new wording of Article V, Section 19, which was
amended months before the decision in Hunter to enumerate specific offenses
for which the legislature was granted broad authority to create rules regarding
transfer. However, the legislature quickly revised the statute mooting the issue
before any challenges to the sole standard could be brought under the more




there is no substantial opportunity for rehabilitation through
facilities available to the juvenile court.4 9
The legislature did carve out an exception to this new
bifurcated standard for children who had been previously
convicted of felony offenses. For this class of children, the statute
still allowed transfer hearings to be held regardless of the pending
offense and required only a finding of "reasonable grounds to
believe that the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation
through facilities available to the court exercising juvenile
jurisdiction."50 Also, the 1980 statutory amendment for the first
time gave added guidance as to what was meant by amenability to
treatment or rehabilitation. 5 The 1980 amendment also included
the addition of an important new procedural protection, a
requirement that the court "inform the child, his parents, tutor or
other custodian, and his counsel of the child's right to move for a
medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination" and consider
the results of such an examination before determining amenability
to treatment or rehabilitation.52
When the Louisiana Children's Code went into effect in 1992,
all of the transfer provisions contained in the Code of Juvenile
Procedure and in Title XIII of the Revised Statutes were at the
same time repealed and replaced with parallel provisions within
the Children's Code. 53 Under the original version of the Children's
Code, only children 15 years of age or older charged with armed
robbery, aggravated burglary, or aggravated kidnapping were
eligible for judicial transfer without any distinction between 15 and
16 year olds or as to whether they had any previous offenses on
their record.54 In order to judicially transfer a child under the
statute, the state had the burden of proving: (1) probable cause the
child committed one of the enumerated offenses; (2) the child was
49. 1980 La. Acts at 1115.
50. Id.
51. Id. ("The court shall consider the chronological age of the child. The
younger the child, the greater shall be the burden on the state to show
unsuitability for juvenile jurisdiction or, that based on the past conduct of the
child that the child is not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. The court
shall consider the maturity of the child, both mental and physical, whether the
child has committed other serious felonies, and such other criteria as the court
deems relevant.").
52. Id. at 1115-16.
53. 1991 La. Acts 706. Sections 1 to 16 of Act 235 enacted the Louisiana
Children's Code. Section 17 repealed the Louisiana Code of Juvenile Procedure
and provisions related to juvenile courts found in Title 13 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes.
54. 1991 La. Acts 706, 856.
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15 or older at the time of the offense and not otherwise subject to
original criminal court jurisdiction; and (3) by clear and
convincing proof, there is no substantial opportunity for the child's
rehabilitation through facilities available to the court.5 5 The statute
also contained the six criteria, unaltered from their current form,
for judging whether there is a substantial opportunity for
rehabilitation. 56
The legislature has amended the rules regarding judicial
transfer several times since the creation of the Children's Code.
The statute was amended in 1993 to add the offenses of attempted
first and second degree murder and aggravated battery to bring the
total number of enumerated offenses subject to judicial transfer to
siX. 57 The same act amended article 862(A) to bring it to its current
two-pronged standard involving a finding of probable cause for an
enumerated offense and no substantial opportunity for
rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. The remaining
former requirement in the eliminated subsection was simply moved
to article 857, which then specified that judicial transfer hearings
were limited to "a child who is fifteen years of age or older at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense but is not otherwise
subject to the original jurisdiction of a court exercising criminal
jurisdiction." 59
In 1994, judicial transfer was once again altered in several
significant ways. First, the minimum age of those subject to
judicial transfer was lowered to its current age of 14 with the
limitation that a transferred 14 year old cannot be confined beyond
his or her 31st birthday.60 Also, the enumerated offenses for which
a youth could be judicially transferred were once again amended to
remove aggravated battery as well as attempted first and second
degree murder while adding actual first and second degree murder
aggravated rape, and aggravated oral sexual battery to the list. 6
The act further specified that armed robbery was subject to judicial
transfer only when committed with a firearm and aggravated
55. Id. at 857-58.
56. These criteria were first enumerated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
its opinion in State v. Everfield, 342 So. 2d 648, 655-56 (La. 1977), and were
adapted from a list contained in a policy memorandum issued by the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court which was appended to the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
See MCGOUGH & TRICHE, supra note 6, at 454-55.
57. 1993 La. Acts 1493, 1502-03.
58. Id. at 1503.
59. Id. at 1502-03.




battery was subject to judicial transfer only when committed by the
discharge of a firearm.62 In 1997, the legislature added forcible
rape when committed upon a child at least two years younger than
the alleged rapist as an enumerated offense subject to judicial
transfer. 3 Finally, in 2001 the legislature repealed the offense of
aggravated oral sexual battery from article 857 to create the current
list of seven enumerated offenses for which a juvenile can be
- * 64judicially waived.
In the judicial waiver context, the legislature continued to
apply common sense notions of adolescence to determine which
classes of children ought to be vulnerable to adult court transfer.
The evolution of judicial waiver, however, was shaped by two
additional variables: (1) judicial precedent with Kent and Everfield;
and (2) notions of the proper exercise of judicial power.
Accordingly, judicial waiver in Louisiana is marked by factors and
procedures meant to guide the discretion of judges. This is so
because judges institutionally are meant to sit as neutral arbiters-
governing the process, evaluating evidence, and coming to a fair
conclusion based on the same. As a consequence, judicial waiver
embraces more substantive and procedural rights for children.
3. Prosecutorial Waiver
Prosecutorial waiver was the last type of waiver created in
Louisiana as it was not added until the advent of the Children's
Code in 1992. In its original form, the statute allowed the
prosecutorial waiver of 15 year olds only if they were charged with
manslaughter but 16 year olds could be waived by the prosecution
for manslaughter, armed robbery, or aggravated burglary.65 In
62. Id.
63. 1997 La. Acts 2079.
64. 2001 La. Acts 675, 677. The elimination of aggravated oral sexual
battery from the list of enumerated offenses resulted from the repeal of the
offense itself from the criminal code by Act No. 301 of 2001 due to its being
subsumed under the crime of rape. MCGOUGH & TRICHE, supra note 6, at 451.
65. 1991 La. Acts 706, 718-19. Article 305(C) and (D) provided:
C.(1) When a child who is sixteen years of age or older at the time of
the commission of manslaughter, armed robbery, or aggravated
burglary is arrested for one of these offenses, he is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until whichever of the
following occurs first:
(a) An indictment charging one of these offenses is returned.
(b) A bill of information charging one of these offenses is filed.
(2) The district attorney shall have the discretion to file a petition
alleging one of these offenses in the juvenile court or alternatively, to
obtain an indictment or file a bill of information. If the child is being
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1994, the rules regarding prosecutorial waiver were consolidated
into subsection B of article 305 to resemble closely the form they
are in today. Distinctions between 15 and 16 year olds were
eliminated, and a new list of 11 enumerated offenses was added,
which closely follows the list of offenses added to the newl
amended Article V, Section 19 of the Louisiana Constitution.
The only offenses eligible for prosecutorial waiver but excluded
held in detention, the district attorney shall make his election and file
the indictment, bill of information, or petition in the appropriate court
within thirty calendar days after the child's arrest, unless the child
waives this right.
(3) If an indictment is returned or a bill of information is filed, the
child is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate court
exercising criminal jurisdiction for all subsequent procedures, including
the review of bail applications, and the child shall be transferred
forthwith to the appropriate adult facility for continued custody prior to
his trial as an adult.
D.(l) When a child who is fifteen years of age or older at the time of
the commission of manslaughter is arrested, he is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until whichever of the
following occurs first:
(a) A manslaughter indictment is returned.
(b) A bill of information charging manslaughter is filed.
(2) The district attorney shall have the discretion to file a petition
alleging manslaughter in the juvenile court or, alternatively to obtain an
indictment or file a bill of information. If the child is being held in
detention, the district attorney shall make his election and file the
indictment, bill of information, or petition in the appropriate court
within thirty calendar days after the child's arrest, unless the child
waives this right.
(3) If an indictment is returned or a bill of information is filed, the
child is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate court
exercising criminal jurisdiction for all subsequent procedures, including
the review of bail applications, and the child shall be transferred
forthwith to the appropriate adult facility for detention prior to his trial
as an adult.
Id.
66. 1994 La. Acts 710, 710-12. The offenses were:
(a) Attempted first degree murder; (b) Attempted second degree
murder; (c) Manslaughter; (d) Armed robbery; (e) Forcible rape; (f)
Simple rape; (g) Second degree kidnapping; (h) A second or
subsequent aggravated battery; (i) A second or subsequent aggravated
burglary; (j) A second or subsequent offense of burglary of an inhabited
dwelling; (k) A second or subsequent felony-grade violation of Part X
or X-B of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
1950 involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent




from the statutory provision were the four offenses subject to
legislative waiver under article 305(A).67
The brevity of Louisiana's history of prosecutorial waiver is
not indicative of the power and reach the Louisiana Legislature
bestowed upon district attorneys around the state. Prosecutorial
waiver is based on one of the lowest legal standards existing in
American jurisprudence-probable cause. Prosecutorial waiver
in Louisiana has no standards to guide discretion, none of the
procedural safeguards attendant to judicial waiver and the law
requires no explanation as to why the prosecutor may choose adult
prosecution. Such appears to ignore present-day adolescent
research and common sense notions of adolescence in favor of
pure deference to the power of the elected district attorney.
4. Lack of Reverse Waiver
Special mention should be made about the absence of reverse
waiver in Louisiana.69 The Children's Code does not contain any
statutory provision or other mechanism allowing the juvenile court
to regain jurisdiction once the event triggering waiver and
divestiture of the juvenile court's jurisdiction under any of the
three types of waiver has occurred. In fact, with regard to the
67. It should also be noted that Act 959 of 1995 added the offense of
aggravated burglary as subsection (e) of article 305(B)(2) but redundantly left a
second or subsequent aggravated burglary as subsection (j). 1995 La. Acts 2597.
Also in 1995, the legislature added aggravated oral sexual battery and
aggravated battery committed with a firearm to the list of enumerated offenses
subject to prosecutorial waiver. 1995 La. Acts 2647, 2647-48. The current list of
enumerated offenses was adopted when the legislature removed aggravated oral
sexual battery from the list in 2001. 2001 La. Acts 675, 677; see supra note 64.
68. See State v. Simms, 571 So. 2d 145, 148-49 (La. 1990) ("Probable
cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge are sufficient to justify a man of ordinary caution in believing that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. The determination of probable
cause, although requiring something more than bare suspicion, does not require
evidence sufficient to support a conviction. Probable cause, as the very name
implies, deals with probabilities. The determination of probable cause, unlike
the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolution of
conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard
demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether
the available evidence supports a reasonable belief that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime." (citations omitted)).
69. Reverse waiver functions as an opportunity for criminal court judges to
return jurisdiction to the juvenile court after a hearing. Reverse waiver is usually
reserved for cases in which the juvenile court lost jurisdiction under legislative,
prosecutorial, or some other form of waiver in which there was no prior
opportunity for a judicial determination of the youth's suitability for removal to
the adult system. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 94.
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statutory and prosecutorial waiver rules established in article 305,
the code specifically notes:
The court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall retain
jurisdiction over the child's case, even though he pleads
guilty to or is convicted of a lesser included offense. A plea
to or conviction of a lesser included offense shall not revest
jurisdiction in the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction
over such a child.70
Similar language appears in the statutes related to judicial
transfer.7 ' Both provisions can be traced back to their respective
parallel provisions in Title XIII of the Revised Statutes, which in
turn were also both originally added by the same 1975 act. 72
The addition of this language statutorily superseded a line of
cases that culminated with the Louisiana Supreme Court holding
that district courts did not have jurisdiction over juveniles to accept
guilty pleas and impose sentences for lesser-included offenses that
were not specifically included in the constitutional provision
related to legislative waiver.73 The result of the holding was that
juveniles convicted in adult court of a non-enumerated, lesser-
included offense would have to be retried in juvenile court.74 The
addition of the explicit statutory wording added in 1975 under the
broad authority of the newly amended constitutional provision put
an end to this narrow form of jurisprudentially developed reverse
waiver.
70. LA. CHELD. CODE ANN. art. 305(D) (Supp. 2010).
71. Id. art. 863(A) (2004). The article provides:
An order of transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the court exercising
juvenile jurisdiction over the child with respect to the delinquent acts
alleged in the petition. The appropriate court exercising criminal
jurisdiction shall retain jurisdiction over the case, even though the child
pleads guilty to, or is convicted of, a lesser included offense. The plea
to, or conviction of, a lesser included offense shall not revest juvenile
jurisdiction over such child.
Id.
72. 1975 La. Acts 764, 764-65.
73. State ex rel. Moore v. Warden of La. State Penitentiary, 308 So. 2d 749,
752 (La. 1975), superseded by statute, 1975 La. Acts at 765 ("Although it can be
argued that the constitutional deposit of jurisdiction in the district courts of the
trial of juveniles in capital [c]ases is the grant of jurisdiction embracing every
part of the case, from arraignment to sentence, we decline to make such a
departure from established jurisprudence . . . .").
74. Id. at 751-52 (reasoning that "the question of double jeopardy is




II. EXAMINING THE PROBLEM WITH LOUISIANA'S WAIVER SYSTEM
The previous Section of this Article describes how Louisiana
arrived at a system of waiver in which a large number of juveniles
either must or may be tried as adults based solely on their age and
charged offense without regard for their individual circumstances
or amenability to rehabilitation. The next Section analyzes some
particularly troubling aspects of those waiver rules and how they
can interact with other Louisiana laws to exacerbate the flaws
generally associated with legislative and prosecutorial waiver and
to leave gaps in protection resulting in the waiver of youth
amenable to rehabilitation with little due process.
A. Failing to Account for Adolescent Brain Development
A common thread running through each problematic aspect of
the waiver system discussed below is its failure to take into
account what the sciences teach and the law now recognizes about
adolescent brain development and the resulting differences
between juveniles and adults. In Roper v. Simmons, the United
States Supreme Court held that the application of the death penalty
to juveniles below the age of 18 was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.75 This finding was based in large part on research
illustrating that juveniles are not as culpable as adults and therefore
that "the penalogical justifications of the death penalty apply to
them with lesser force than to adults."76 Various scientific and
sociological studies were cited by the Roper Court as a principal
justification for finding the application of the death penalty to all
juveniles below the age of 18 was cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 7 These justifications apply
with at least equal force to Louisiana's system of waiver. Due to
natural biologically rooted developmental factors, children in most
cases lack the maturity, sense of responsibility, independence, and
general character required to expose them to adult sanctions in
adult court. These fundamental differences between juveniles and
adults are rooted in ver real biological differences between
juvenile and adult brains. 8 The scientific studies detailed in the
75. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
76. Id. at 571.
77. Id. at 578-79.
78. Brief of American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549
[hereinafter AMA Brief]; Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri
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amici briefs submitted in Roper (and relied on by the Court)
explain that the differences in juvenile and adult culpability result
from the anatomically underdeveloped nature of the juvenile brain.
These studies revealed that "regions of the adolescent brain do not
reach a fully mature state until after the age of 18," and
"psychosocial maturity is incomplete until age 19."79 Children's
brains are biologically less developed, resulting in less culpability
for their actions when compared to adults.
Specifically, the Roper Court identified three significant
differences between adults and juveniles under age 18 that impact
juveniles' culpability.80 First, "[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions."8' Second, juveniles are more susceptible to outside
influence and peer pressure. 82 Third, the character of juveniles is
not well-formed, and, therefore, juvenile personality traits are more
transitory than those of adults. Based on this scientific research,
the Roper Court concluded that the differences between juveniles
and adults "render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls
among the worst offenders." 84 The Court explained:
The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and
irresponsible behavior means "their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." Their own
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their
immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater
claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment. The reality
that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably
depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an
adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's
Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-10, Roper,
543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447.
79. AMA Brief, supra note 78, at 2, 7.
80. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
81. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 570.
84. Id.
213
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
character deficiencies will be reformed . . . . [O]nce the
diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is
evident that the penological justifications for the death
penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.8 5
These conclusions were recently reaffirmed in the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Florida, which
extended the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment to prohibit the imposition of the penalty of life
without the possibility of parole for non-homicide cases involving
juveniles.8 6 This Article does not suggest that the courts are ready
to apply the Eighth Amendment to legislative, prosecutorial, or any
other type of waiver.
Policymakers should, however, be aware of the implications of
adolescent development issues when they make rules abandoning
the juvenile justice system by facilitating the funneling of juveniles
into criminal court where they are subjected to rigid punitive rules
and conditions designed for adults. Louisiana's juvenile justice
system is by no means a panacea, but thanks to ongoing reform
efforts, it is a vastly improved rehabilitative system specially
designed and equipped to handle issues of adolescent
development.8 7 For that reason, the capacity of the juvenile justice
system to rehabilitate juveniles, even those accused of serious
offenses, should not be underestimated. As the examples below
illustrate, failure to take into account the lessons of adolescent
development elaborated in Roper and Graham when developing
policies directly or indirectly affecting waiver results in
ineffective, wasteful, and oftentimes counterproductive outcomes
for the youth involved and in the long-term also undermine public
safety.
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
Most offenses subject to waiver also carry with them
mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration. Each of the four
85. Id. at 570-71 (citations omitted).
86. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) ("No recent data
provide reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature
of juveniles. As petitioner's amici point out, developments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds.").
87. For a summary of the progress and challenges of Louisiana's juvenile
justice system, see JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., MODELS FOR
CHANGE: BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR JUVENLE JUSTICE REFORM (2006),
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-12_REPModels
ForChangeJJ.pdf.
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offenses statutorily excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction under
Louisiana's system of legislative waiver, commonly known as
"305(A)" offenses, carry a mandatory minimum sentence of "life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence."88 Offenses falling under the state's
system of prosecutorial waiver, commonly referred to as "305(B)"
offenses, offer a wider range of possible punishments.89 Still, with
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 2010) (first degree murder); id. §
14:30.1 (second degree murder); id. § 14:42 (2007) (aggravated rape); id. §
14:44 (aggravated kidnapping). However, the recent ruling in Graham now
precludes the sentencing ofjuveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for non-homicide offenses as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As a result, juveniles transferred for
aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping in Louisiana will have to be
afforded a "realistic opportunity to obtain release" such that they are not
guaranteed to die in prison. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
89. Attempted first and second degree murder are punishable by
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than 50 years without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14:27(D)(1)(a) (2007). Manslaughter has a 40-year maximum but does not have
a minimum sentence unless the victim is under the age of ten, in which case a
mandatory minimum of ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation or
suspension of sentence does apply. Id. § 14:31(B) (Supp. 2010). Armed robbery
carries a sentence of 10 to 99 years of incarceration without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, except that the minimum sentence
increases to 15 years if the dangerous weapon used is a firearm. Id. §§ 14:64,
:64.3 (2007). Aggravated burglary is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor
for not less than one nor more than 30 years. Id. § 14:60. Forcible rape carries a
sentence of between 5 and 40 years of incarceration with a requirement that at
least two of the years be without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence. Id. § 14:42.1. Simple rape carries a maximum sentence of 25 years
with or without hard labor and no minimum, but any time given must be served
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Id. § 14:43.
Second degree kidnapping requires that the offender be imprisoned at hard labor
for not less than five nor more than 40 years, with the requirement that at least
two years of the sentence be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension
of sentence. Id. § 14:44.1(C). The sentence for aggravated battery is a fine of not
more than $5,000, imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than
ten years, or both. Id. § 14:34. The sentence for simple burglary of an inhabited
dwelling is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than one year, without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, but not more than 12
years. Id. § 14:62.2. The sentences for transferable second or subsequent felony-
grade drug offenses involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with
intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances range from a sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than 30 years for
marijuana, id. § 40:966(B) (Supp. 2010), to imprisonment at hard labor for not
less than ten nor more than 30 years, at least ten years of which shall be served
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for offenses
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the exception of aggravated battery, simple rape, and under certain
circumstances manslaughter, all of the 305(B) offenses require
minimum terms of incarceration ranging from 1 to 15 years in
length. A youth who is transferred via judicial waiver under article
857 faces the same mandatory minimum sentences as one
transferred under legislative or prosecutorial waiver except a youth
who is 14 years old at the time of the offense may not be
incarcerated beyond his or her 31st birthday.90 As a result, most
transferred juveniles are subject to the same mandatory minimum
sentencing laws as adults.
The two primary goals of mandatory minimum sentencing are
crime deterrence and the incapacitation of serious offenders. 91
However, harsh sentencing laws are not an effective deterrent for
juvenile crime because juveniles tend to act impulsively and not
think about the long-term consequences of their actions when
engaging in delinquent behavior. 2 In fact, research indicates
transferred youth in general are more likely to recidivate more
quickly, more often, and for more serious crimes than non-
transferred youth, even when controlling for factors such as age,
waiver offense, and prior record. 93 With regard to incapacitation, in
many individual cases mandatory minimum sentencing does
indeed result in some extended period of incapacitation for waived
youth convicted of one of these offenses. 94 However, the
immediate benefit of whatever incapacitation results is probably
outweighed by the increased likelihood of recidivism of youth
involving the production or manufacturing of cocaine-based substances, id §
40:967(B)(4).
90. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857(B) (Supp. 2010). Since a youth who is
arrested at 14 can spend up to the next 17 years in prison until his 31st birthday,
all of the mandatory minimum sentences are applicable to judicially waived 14
year olds except for the life without parole sentence called for by first and
second degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping.
91. See Gary Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 65
(1993).
92. See Cathi J. Hunt, Juvenile Sentencing: Effects of Recent Punitive
Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in
the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 655-56 (1999).
93. See id. at 656.
94. Whether there is a net gain in incapacitation from our system of waiver
and sentencing is less clear since many waiver offenses are also subject to
mandatory minimums in juvenile court under Louisiana Children's Code article
897.1. Also, the tendency of some judges to treat transferred juveniles more
leniently than their adult counterparts and the added pressure on juveniles to
plea down to a probation-eligible offense makes it difficult to predict the effects
of these policies on incapacitation in general. See Hunt, supra note 92, at 658.
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exiting the punitive adult system. 95 What is clear under current
mandatory minimum sentencing policies is that the sentencing
judge does not have discretion to deviate from the statutory
minimum and give probation or a shorter jail sentence even when
the youth's record, level of involvement in the offense, or
receptiveness to community-based services indicates such a course
of action would maintain public safety and be more cost effective.
C. The Law of Principals
The Louisiana Criminal Code recognizes only principals and
accessories after the fact as classifications for parties to a crime.96
In other words, Louisiana does not have a separate classification or
theory of criminal liability for accessories who participate at some
diminished level in the planning or execution of a crime. 97 Rather,
the term "principal" is broadly defined to encompass "[a]ll persons
concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent,
and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense,
aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or
procure another to commit the crime." 98 As a result, accomplices to
crimes in Louisiana are equally subject to the full range of charges
and penalties as the main actor in the crime no matter how minor a
role they play in the commission of the offense. For specific intent
crimes, the state still bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the principal to a crime acted with the
required level of intent or mens rea.99 However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held "under general principles of accessorial
liability, 'all parties [to a crime] are guilty for deviations from the
95. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 154-55.
96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:23 (2007).
97. Traditionally, common law states divided parties to a felony into the
following four categories in order to allow for different degrees of punishment:
(1) principals in the first degree; (2) principals in the second degree (aiders and
abettors present at the scene of the crime); (3) accessories before the fact; and
(4) accessories after the fact. However, the federal government and most states
statutorily eliminated these distinctions over the years, resulting in systems of
full accessorial liability similar to Louisiana's in most jurisdictions. See Baruch
Weiss, What Were They Thinking? The Mental States ofAider and Abettor and
Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1357 (2002); see also
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 96-98
(1985).
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:24 (2007).
99. State v. Tate, 851 So. 2d 921, 930 (La. 2003) ("[S]o long as the State
sufficiently proves that the defendant is a principal and that he possessed the
requisite specific intent, a conviction for first degree murder will be upheld.").
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common plan which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying
out the plan." 00 As a result, the felony murder provision
contained within Louisiana's definition of second degree murder,
which carries a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility
of parole, applies to codefendants even when the action that
resulted in death was another's deviation from the common plan.' 0'
Although Louisiana-specific data is unavailable, the
disproportionate effects of the law of principals on transferred
juveniles, particularly in the case of mandatory waiver, is clear
because of the pronounced tendency of juveniles to offend in
groups rather than as lone individuals at a much higher rate than
adults.10 2 As one expert on the topic explains, "[t]he group context
of most juvenile offending is not simply one characteristic of youth
crime, it is an essential feature of the juvenile offender and a
major distinction between juvenile and adult offending."9f03 This
tendency toward juvenile group offending is consistent with
Roper's description of adolescents as being categorically more
impulsive, short-sighted, and susceptible to peer pressure than
adults. Accordingly, the law of principals exposes a comparatively
larger percentage of youth with very little involvement in a crime
to harsh and. often mandatory consequences of the law such as
waiver and minimum periods of incarceration. In this context, it is
difficult to justify an equal distribution of liability and punishment
between certain juveniles who are the least culpable party to a
crime by nature of their limited involvement and understanding
and adult codefendants with primarily roles in the planning and
carrying out the offense.
Such a result does not comport with even the most punitive
concepts of justice, such as those based on retribution. Retributive
justice focuses on the moral imperative to hold offenders
accountable for their actions rather than on more pragmatic
justifications for punishment.104 As such, it is frequently used to
counter the policy arguments of juvenile justice reformers
100. State v. Smith, 748 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (La. 1999) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUsTIN W. SCOTT,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 211-12 (1986)).
101. See id.
102. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 90 (2005).
103. Id.
104. Joseph F. Yeckel, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal
Intervention in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 351
(1997).
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advocating for restrictions on the use of waiver.' 05 However, a
central tenet of retributive justice is the punishment must "fit the
crime: 'Its degree must be proportionate to the seriousness or
moral gravity of the offense."" 06 Although individuals may
disagree with what constitutes a proper fit in any given case, the
basic principles of retributive justice require at a minimum persons
be punished "in proportion to their personal guilt and in proportion
to their personal involvement in the crime."' 0 7 Yet, Louisiana's
rules of liability and waiver expose a reluctant juvenile lookout of
limited intelligence with no prior record to the same consequences
as a seasoned adult criminal who plans, recruits, and ruthlessly
carries out the crime. When the law of principals, mandatory
waiver, and mandatory sentencing interact to result in the
punishing of such vastly unequal acts in an equally harsh manner,
the interests of retributive justice are not served. 8 Though this
criticism can apply to both juvenile and adult principals with minor
roles in serious offenses, the tendency of juveniles to offend in
groups combined with their diminished culpability, and heightened
vulnerability to peer pressure makes a retributive justification for
the law of principals all the more difficult in cases of juvenile
waiver.
On a more practical level, the law of principals simply adds
another level of rigidity to the waiver system, which needlessly
wastes resources by exposing youth to the negative effects of the
punitive and inflexible adult system without regard for their degree
of culpability or the likelihood of their rehabilitation within the
juvenile justice system. As noted previously, the general deterrent
effects of laws establishing harsh consequences for criminal
behavior is lost on juveniles because of their impulsivity and
inability to take into account long-term consequences.1 09 Certainly,
the law of principals facilitates the incapacitation of youth in so far
105. See Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38
ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 668 (1994).
106. See Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the
Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian
Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1549, 1559 (2002) (quoting Joel
Feinburg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 728 (Joel Feinberg &
Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000)).
107. See Joshua Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another:
Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 17, 53 (1979).
108. See Dressler, supra note 97, at 115-21 (systematically refuting each of
the traditional nonutilitarian moral justifications for coequal accomplice
liability).
109. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 129.
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as it expands the potential for longer periods of incarceration. The
benefits of such specific deterrence, however, are likely
outweighed by the increase in recidivism rates that result when
low-level group offenders that could have been rehabilitated in the
juvenile justice system or simply would have aged out of crime are
released from the punitive adult system as lone offenders or, even
worse, as new ringleaders now capable of recruiting other youth to
offend." 0
D. Competency Protections
Juvenile defendants in Louisiana, whether in juvenile or
criminal court, enjoy the same due process protection as adult
defendants requiring they be mentally competent to stand trial."1
In order to safeguard this right for juveniles, Louisiana law
recognizes the need to take the science of adolescent development
into account when dealing with the issue of competency in
minors. 112 It does so through the establishment in the Children's
Code of enhanced requirements and procedures for determining
and restoring the mental capacity to proceed of juveniles and for
disposing of cases in which a juvenile is deemed irrestorably
incompetent." 3 Additionally, the Children's Code contains a
special competency protection specifically relating to waiver. Once
a competency examination has been ordered, article 305(E) of the
110. See Joan McCord & Kevin P. Conway, Patterns of Juvenile
Delinquency and Co-Offending, in CRIME AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (Elin
Waring & David Weisburd eds., 2002).
111. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The United States
Supreme Court has never explicitly extended competency protections to
juveniles. However, Louisiana statutorily grants juveniles "[a]ll rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants" under the state or federal constitution except
for the right to trial by jury. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 808 (2004).
Furthermore, the existence of a competency requirement for juveniles can be
confidently derived from the court's general extension of other due process
protections to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (extending the right to notice, counsel, confrontation, and cross-
examination as well as the privilege against self-incrimination to defendants in
delinquency proceedings); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(requiring a guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard in delinquency
proceedings); MCGOUGH & TRIcHE, supra note 6, at 416 (arguing the rights
extended in Gault are "meaningless if the accused lacks the competence to
understand the nature of the charge, the range of penalties, and the possibilities
of a defense").
112. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles and Adults' Competence as Trial
Defendants, 27 LAW & HUm. BEHAv. 33 (2002); see also McGOUGH & TRICHE,
supra note 6, at 413-15.
113. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 832-38 (2004 & Supp. 2010).
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Children's Code prohibits any "further steps to prosecute the
child" in adult court (except for the filing of a delinquency
petition) until counsel has been appointed and the court finds the
child has the mental capacity to proceed with the case.114
The Louisiana Legislature unanimously adopted this protection
in 2008 upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law
Institute for the expressed purpose of ensuring a halt to all action
related to waiver once a competency commission is ordered in
juvenile court and until the issue of competency is resolved.'" 5
However, article 305(E) does not prevent the waiver of
incompetent youth in all instances since the district attorney may
waive a child by obtaining an indictment before the child is
arrested, appointed an attorney, given a meaningful opportunity to
consult with the attorney, or otherwise has an opportunity to raise
competency in the juvenile court." 6 As a result, article 305(E)'s
protection against the transfer of incompetent youth is incomplete.
Louisiana's failure to prevent the waiver of incompetent
juveniles in some cases but not others is difficult to justify because
in all cases the benefits of waiving incompetent youth to adult
court are non-existent while the resulting harm to the youth can be
grave. Granting all potentially incompetent youth an opportunity to
have that determination made in juvenile court prior to waiver
would not create a loophole for avoiding waiver, result in the
release of violent youth, or lead to any greater delay of trial than if
the competency determination were made in adult court. First, the
venue for the competency proceedings should not affect the
ultimate outcome of the determination because the substantive
114. Id. art. 305(E)(1) (Supp. 2010) ("If a competency or sanity examination
is ordered, except for the filing of a delinquency petition, no further steps to
prosecute the child in a court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall occur until
(a) Counsel is appointed for the child and notified in accordance with Article
809; and (b) The court determines mental capacity to proceed in accordance
with Chapter 7 of Title VIII.").
115. LA. SENATE, 2008 LEGISLATIVE SESSION HIGHLIGHTS 100 (2008),
available at http://senate.legis.state.1a.us/sessioninfo/2008/highlights/2008High
lights.pdf; see MCGOUGH & TRICHE, supra note 6, at 28.
116. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A)-(B). Furthermore, the district
attorney in at least one jurisdiction has interpreted article 305(E) as allowing the
return of an indictment while competency proceedings in juvenile court are
pending. Although the appellate court upheld the plain reading of the statute as
barring the state from seeking the indictment and dismissed the state's
arguments related to prescription, the opinion has only persuasive value outside
of the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal and does not prevent prosecutors
in other appellate jurisdictions from engaging in the same practice. See State ex
rel. T.C., 35 So. 3d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2010).
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legal standard for competency is the same for both juveniles and
adults regardless of the court." 7 Likewise, the same special
juvenile procedures for determining competency contained in the
Children's Code must be used whether the youth remains in
juvenile court or is waived to criminal court. As a result,
juveniles gain no strategic legal advantage from having
competency proceedings conducted in juvenile court.
Second, any fears that violent or dangerous youth are more
likely to be released into the community if competency is
determined in juvenile court are unfounded. Juvenile court judges
have the same authority to detain dangerous defendants pending
the completion of competency proceedings and trial as criminal
court judges.'1 9 As elected officials, juvenile court judges face the
same pressures and motivations to detain dangerous codefendants
as their adult counterparts.120 Additionally, the fact that juvenile
delinquency proceedings involving crimes of violence are open to
the public in Louisiana makes release of a juvenile in a high profile
transfer case unlikely.121 In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
there is no reason to believe requiring competency proceedings to
be held in juvenile court prior to waiver increases the risk of
dangerous individuals being released into the community.
117. Defendants in criminal court are deemed incompetent "when, as a result
of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641 (2003). The same legal standard applies to juveniles
in delinquency proceedings since the Children's Code does not contain a
different standard and requires adherence to the Code of Criminal Procedure
when special procedures are not established in the Children's Code. LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 803 (2004). However, the detailed requirements contained in the
Children's Code for the content of competency commission reports provides
further guidance for judges of special factors to consider in determining if a
juvenile meets the Code of Criminal Procedure's standard for mental incapacity
to proceed. See id. art. 837 (Supp. 2010).
118. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 644.1 (Supp. 2010).
119. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 819-30 (2004 & Supp. 2010); cf LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 311-47 (2003 & Supp. 2010).
120. In fact, only the four largest parishes in Louisiana (Caddo, Orleans,
Jefferson, and East Baton Rouge) have specialized juvenile courts and therefore
separate juvenile court judges. In all other judicial districts, the same judges
from district, parish, or city courts exercise juvenile court jurisdiction. KATE
MITCHELL, THE LOUISIANA JUVENILE DEFENDER TRIAL PRACTICE MANUAL 30
(2007).
121. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 407 (2003) ("[T]he court shall allow
the proceedings to be open to the public when the alleged delinquent act
committed by the child would be considered a crime of violence as defined in
R.S. 14:2(B), or when the alleged delinquent act would be a second or
subsequent felony-grade adjudication.").
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Finally, competency proceedings in juvenile court do not take
longer than the same proceedings in criminal court, and so raising
competency in juvenile court cannot be used as a dilatory tactic by
the defense for delaying trial. To begin with, the juvenile court is
only required to order a competency commission triggering a halt
to proceedings if it "has reasonable grounds to doubt the mental
capacity of the child to proceed."l 22 This threshold is itself a check
on the frivolous raising of competency. If the competency
commission is ordered, however, the special competency
procedures that apply to minors in both juvenile and criminal court
contain strict timelines requiring the competency hearing to be
held within 45 days of the appointment of the competency
commission when the youth is detained and allow only one 15-day
extension of this timeline.12 3 Once a youth is found competent by
the juvenile court, he or she can be transferred normally under any
of the types of waiver which apply to the case. 124 Under current
law, even a youth who is found to be incompetent and is not
restored by the time of his or her 21st birthday can be transferred
to adult court at that time.125 As a result, the only practical effect of
preventing waiver until a youth is determined competent is a delay
in the timing of the indictment or the bill of information and
therefore waiver, not a delay in trial or overall case processing
time. Operating under the same timelines applicable to waived
youth in criminal court, juvenile defendants cannot cause greater
delay by having their competency determined in juvenile court.
On the other hand, there are a number of philosophical and
practical objections to the current system in which youth with
genuine issues of competency may be irreversibly waived to adult
court without an opportunity for a competency determination in
juvenile court. Most notably, it makes little sense to have criminal
court judges without particular expertise in juvenile issues and
possessing much less familiarity with the Children's Code
procedures making decisions on an issue as complex as adolescent
competency in lieu of specialized juvenile court judges.' 26 If the
122. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 833(A) (Supp. 2010).
123. Id. art. 836(A). The timeline for non-detained youth is 60 days with one
15-day extension allowed.
124. Id. art. 305(E).
125. Id. arts. 305(E)(2), 857(C).
126. See Feld, supra note 7, at 125-26 (discussing the general lack of
expertise of criminal court judges vis-A-vis juvenile court judges in handling
juvenile cases). Although only four parishes have specialized juvenile courts,
see supra note 120, they are the largest four parishes with the state's most
populous urban centers, making it likely that the issue of differing levels of
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purpose of competency proceedings is to determine accurately a
juvenile's level of competence and order the most effective
treatment and services for restoring incompetent youth, then
juvenile courts are logically better equipped to achieve that goal.
Another drawback of the current system with potential for
irreversible harm is the place of detention for incompetent youth
who are waived to criminal court. Once an incompetent juvenile's
case is transferred to adult court, the juvenile is also physically
transferred to an adult jail.127 As referenced in this Article's
introduction, incarcerating children with adults can have serious
negative psychological and physical consequences for the youth.128
In addition to the general concerns associated with incarcerating
juveniles in adult jails, however, Louisiana's system for assessing
and restoring the competency of adults presents particular cause
for worry.
Although Children's Code procedures are used in the initial
determination of competency for waived youth, normal adult
procedures are used once a waived juvenile is found incompetent
for the provision of restoration services and disposition of the case
if the youth is not restorable.129 The problem is the Code of
Criminal Procedure allows only one option for individuals who are
found incompetent, considered likely to commit crimes of
violence, and are not restorable in a short period: commitment to
the Feliciana Forensic Facility.130 For an incompetent juvenile, this
can mean languishing in the adult jail without any access to mental
health or competency restoration services for extended periods of
time. 131 On the other hand, an incompetent youth who remains
expertise and familiarity with juvenile issues and procedures will apply to a
significant percentage ofjuvenile waiver cases where competency is an issue.
127. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 306, 864(B) (2004).
128. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 2.
129. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 644.1(B) (Supp. 2010).
130. Id. art. 648(A)(2)(a) ("If the person is charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor classified as an offense against the person and considered by the
court to be likely to commit crimes of violence, and if the court determines that
his mental capacity is likely to be restored within ninety days as a result of
treatment, the court may order immediate jail-based treatment by the
Department of Health and Hospitals not to exceed ninety days; otherwise, if his
capacity cannot be restored within ninety days and inpatient treatment is
recommended, the court shall commit the defendant to the Feliciana Forensic
Facility.").
131. A lawsuit filed by a disability rights organization alleges the average
wait time for an incompetent inmate to be transferred to the facility is over six
months, with one inmate waiting more than two years for a slot to open. See
Laura Maggi, Defendants Wait Too Long for Pretrial Care, Lawsuit Says,
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under juvenile court jurisdiction has access to a number of
treatment and dispositional options under the Children's Code.13 2
In other words, criminal courts do not have nearly the same
resources or legal options available to juvenile courts for restoring
competency and dealing with irrestorable youth. As a result,
allowing the waiver of incompetent youth may result in a greater
delay until trial because adult courts are not as effective at restoring
youth to competency. For these reasons, the current system in which
incompetent juveniles can be irreversibly waived without a
competency hearing in juvenile court can lead to inefficient and
inaccurate results that may actually delay trial and burdens an
already strained adult system in addition to harming the youth.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The following Section contains a non-exhaustive list of
recommendations for potential modifications to the Louisiana
waiver system that could ameliorate, to varying degrees, the
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 13, 2010, available at http://www.
nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/defendants wait too longfor_p.html.
132. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 837(B) (Supp. 2010). The juvenile court
may:
(1) Dismiss the petition in accordance with Article 876.
(2) Adjudicate the family of the child to be in need of services and
proceed to a disposition in accordance with Chapters 10 and 12 of Title
VII.
(3) Commit the child to the Department of Health and Hospitals, a
private mental institution, or an institution for the mentally ill in
accordance with Department of Health and Hospitals policy. The court
may also order restoration services for the child and appoint a
restoration service provider. However, a child shall not be committed
unless the court finds, after a contradictory hearing with ten days notice
to the district attorney and counsel for the child, that the child, as a
result of mental illness, is dangerous to himself or others or is gravely
disabled. If the court further finds that the child will not have the
mental capacity to proceed in the foreseeable future, the court shall
order civil commitment as provided in Title XIV. However, no child
shall be discharged or conditionally discharged except upon court order
after a motion and contradictory hearing.
(4) Place the child in the custody of his parents or other suitable
person or private or public institution or agency under such terms and
conditions as deemed in the best interests of the child and the public,
which conditions may include the provision of outpatient services by
any suitable public or private agency. The court may also order
restoration services for the child and appoint a restoration service
provider.
Id.
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deficiencies resulting from the failure to take into account the
categorical differences between adolescents and adults related to
brain development and their impact on individual cases.
A. Eliminate Legislative and Prosecutorial Waiver
The most obvious way to incorporate the lessons of adolescent
brain development into waiver policy is by requiring
individualized judicial determinations of suitability for transfer
based on standards related to assessing diminished culpability and
amenability to rehabilitation. Only such individualized
determinations would allow a judge with expertise in adolescent
development to determine whether a juvenile can still benefit from
the juvenile justice system or if the juvenile is competent, culpable
and mature enough to face the consequences of waiver.
This, of course, would require the elimination of legislative and
prosecutorial waiver altogether. Given the policy trend of
expanding waiver which has dominated the last two decades, the
chances of removing these firmly entrenched types of waiver
through one fell legislative swoop are limited, to say the least. The
possibility of challenging automatic and prosecutorial waiver on
the basis of constitutional due process and equal protection
concerns are similarly slim. The Louisiana Supreme Court shut the
door on these types of arguments in Leach and Perique, and the
United States Supreme Court has until now declined to address the
constitutionality of these types of waiver.1 33 Nevertheless, in light
133. Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909, 909-13 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). The dissenting Justices observed:
First. A juvenile or "child" is placed in a more protected position than an
adult, not by the Constitution but by an Act of Congress. In that category
he is theoretically subject to rehabilitative treatment. Can he on the whim
or caprice of a prosecutor be put in the class of the run-of-the-mill
criminal defendants, without any hearing, without any chance to be
heard, without an opportunity to rebut the evidence against him, without
a chance of showing that he is being given an invidiously different
treatment from others in his group? Kent and Gault suggest that those are
very substantial constitutional questions. Second. The barricade behind
which the prosecutor operates is that this, like other prosecutions, is
committed to his informed discretion, which is beyond the reach of
judicial intrusion .... The reasons for a judicial check of prosecutors'
discretion are stronger than for such a check of other administrative
discretion that is now traditionally reviewable. Important interests are at
stake. Abuses are common. The questions involved are appropriate for
judicial determination. And much injustice could be corrected." These
two questions are large questions and substantial ones. I would grant the
petition for certiorari in order to resolve them.
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of the new scientific evidence and attitudes regarding the
diminished culpability and increased malleability of adolescents as
well as the potential negative impacts of transfer, one can still hope
a majority on one of these courts may one day be willing to
recognize the proposition put forth by the dissent in Bland that the
issues raised by prosecutorial waiver present "very substantial
constitutional questions."' 34 Until then, the more measured
approaches described below present more realistic alternatives for
at least mitigating some of the worst harms of our current rigid
waiver system.
B. Add Reverse Waiver
In the absence of an individualized determination of suitability
for transfer on the front end, the possibility of reverse waiver by
the criminal court on the back end is likely the next best thing.
Supporters of reverse waiver find it can
act as a check against overcharging by prosecutors by
allowing for an examination of the minor's role in the
alleged offense, potential for rehabilitation, and other
factors beyond the minor's age and the seriousness of the
charged offense. Reverse transfer statutes also mitigate the
consequences of overly broad transfer statutes that sweep
into criminal court accomplices, non-violent, and first-time
offenders.135
Even supporters of prosecutorial waiver acknowledge "[t]he only
device that seems capable of effectively supervising a prosecutor's
exercise of discretion is some form of judicial review., 1 36 In this
manner, reverse waiver can help correct some of the most blatant
ills of the current inflexible system, such as when incompetent
youth are waived without opportunity for a determination in
juvenile court or when the law of principals leads to charging
decisions that result in the automatic waiver of youth of
particularly limited culpability who could clearly still benefit from
the juvenile justice system.
Id. at 911-13 (citation omitted) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 211-12 (1969)).
134. Id. at 911.
135. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth
of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 693 (2002).
136. McCarthy, supra note 105, at 668.
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Though data is limited, studies in two jurisdictions with reverse
waiver statutes revealed between 10 and 31% of waived youth
were returned to juvenile court, with the most likely to be returned
being "[flemales, younger offenders, those without prior arrests,
and those charged with lesser felonies." 37 Reverse waiver,
however, is less preferable than an exclusive reliance on judicial
waiver because of the burden it places on the resources of the
criminal courts and because the criminal judges making the
decisions and the probation officers, social workers, and mental
health professionals that they rely upon for input often do not have
the "knowlecge and training of their juvenile court
counterparts."
C. Eliminate Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Waived Youth
As explained in the previous Section, mandatory minimum
sentencing adds another layer of rigidity to already harsh waiver
laws in a manner that serves little penalogical purpose and can
exacerbate negative outcomes for youth and, in the long run,
society. As a result, many juvenile advocates have been calling for
a "youth exception to such one size fits all sentences."l 39 A simple
way of eliminating this harmful aspect of our waiver system
without having to rewrite the Criminal Code is by adding a single
provision to the Children's Code stating that, notwithstanding any
other law to the contrary, transferred or waived juveniles are not
subject to the mandatory minimum sentences applicable to actual
adults.
D. Increase Competency Protections
Competency protections for youth facing waiver in Louisiana
need to be strengthened, not weakened. 14 There is no reason
juvenile court jurisdiction should be divested for any youth with
pending competency proceedings, particularly as a finding of
competency would not preclude a subsequent waiver in any way.
137. Bishop, supra note 6, at 112.
138. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 135, at 694; see also Bishop, supra
note 6, at 112.
139. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 135, at 698.
140. During the 2010 legislative session, an attempt to eliminate this
protection altogether almost succeeded but was thwarted when House Bill 1106
died in a Senate committee after having been unanimously approved in the
House of Representatives. 2010 Regular Session-Instrument Information, LA.
LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.state.1a.us/billdata/byinst.asp?sessionid=10RS&
billid=HB1 106&doctype=ALL (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
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Given what is now known about the differences between juveniles
and adults, determinations regarding an area inextricably linked to
adolescent brain development like competency should be made in
the juvenile court, where the judge and professionals working with
the child have specialized knowledge and the available alternatives
for those found incompetent are tailored for juveniles.' 4 1 Resolving
competency issues in juvenile court for all cases will have the
added benefit of relieving a resource drain on an overburdened
adult mental health system that will then be better able to treat the
adults they were designed to serve.
E. Improve Data Collection
The creation of laws expanding waiver in Louisiana and across
the nation "did not flow from or build on careful research. Recent
research demonstrates convincingly that if changes in transfer
policy had been contingent on scientific evidence of their efficacy,
they would have been rejected." 42 There is currently no publicly
available or centrally maintained data in Louisiana tracking
numbers, method of waiver, demographic information, offense
information, and outcomes for waived youth either in individual
jurisdictions or statewide. If Louisiana is to form an intelligent
policy surrounding waiver based on empirically proven methods of
increasing public safety, then better data will be needed to
understand who the children being waived are, what offenses they
are committing, and what is happening to them as a result of the
waiver process.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of Louisiana's system for waiving and
transferring youth to adult court has not been linear in its
trajectory. It would be misleading to characterize the history of
waiver in Louisiana as an uninterrupted movement away from a
system focused on individualized determinations of opportunity for
rehabilitation toward one that focuses almost exclusively on the
age of the accused and the charging of an enumerated offense
contained in an ever-expanding list of crimes. The truth is judicial
transfer existed for only 17 years prior to the creation of the first
prosecutorial waiver statute and both of these types of waiver are
141. See Brian G. Sellers & Bruce A. Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer,
Developmental Maturity, and Adjudicative Competence: An Ethical and Justice
Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 435, 439-40 (2009).
142. Bishop, supra note 6, at 154-55.
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relatively recent additions to Louisiana's juvenile laws, although
legislative waiver dates to the creation of the state's juvenile
justice system itself. All three types of waiver experienced
additions and subtractions to the offenses that fall under their
purview, revisions to their respective standards, and criteria that
made it both easier and more difficult at various times to waive a
youth to adult court.
Nevertheless, the 1990s undoubtedly marked a turning point in
which the number of juveniles exposed to waiver expanded greatly
due to the lowering of the age of youth eligible for waiver under
set circumstances, a substantial net increase in the number of
offenses subject to waiver, and the introduction of prosecutorial
waiver. It is also clear Louisiana's waiver laws do not operate in a
vacuum. Rather, they are inextricably linked to the laws and rules
of a broader criminal justice system, such as the law of principals
and mandatory minimum sentences, which are often promulgated
without any consideration for the peculiar circumstances of youth.
Science related to adolescent brain development has revealed that
youth are categorically less culpable than adults because they are
less mature, more susceptible to peer pressure, and more malleable
than adults. The United States Supreme Court recognized this fact
in finding both the death penalty in all cases and now life without
parole in non-homicide cases to be cruel and unusual punishment
when applied to juveniles. Yet Louisiana's waiver laws, developed
before this research was widely available and accepted, continue to
operate in a context in which neither the categorical nor the
individual differences related to a juvenile defendant's adolescent
stage of development are legally relevant except in a narrow
subsection of waiver cases involving judicial transfer.
The result is a system of waiver in which society spends a
significant amount of limited resources incarcerating transferred
youth who could be amenable to rehabilitation for extended
periods of time in punitive adult prisons with little services and
high recidivism rates. Both the youth in question and society as a
whole would be better served by a flexible and efficient system for
identifying those children who are amenable to rehabilitation and
ensuring they receive the benefits of the juvenile justice system or
are at least spared from the most harmful effects of the punitive
adult system. The recommendations in this Article are a non-
exhaustive list of partial remedies that can bring Louisiana closer
to a system that recognizes those differences and uses them to
make decisions which benefit youth, increase public safety, and are
cost effective.
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